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Third-party defendant and appellant, Cigna Healthplan ("Cigna"), 
submits this Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Appellee, Charles V. 
Pledger, M.D. ("Pledger"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Using the same arguments by which he was able to convince the trial 
court of his status as the injured party in this case, Pledger seeks to 
convince this Court that Cigna affirmatively waived its rights to demand and 
obtain arbitration with respect to the dispute arising from the services 
Pledger, a physician under contract with Cigna, provided to Mrs. Ople 
Gillespie ("Mrs. Gillespie"), a plan participant in a Cigna Health Benefits 
Plan. The evidence in the record does not support the trial court's "findings" 
insofar as the trial court found (1) that Cigna waited from "before February 
14,1994, the date of the letter from Defendant's Counsel, which referred to 
CIGNA's knowledge of Dr. Pledger's claim, to August 30, 1996, to seek 
arbitration," (2) that Cigna delayed in taking action "knowing that Mrs. 
Gillespie was exposed to judgment and that Dr. Pledger's claim was being 
pursued through this suit," and (3) [Mrs. Gillespie] has never offered a 
1 
defense to [Pledger's] claim; she has never disputed the amount of the bill." 
The evidence does not support the trial court's finding that "[arbitration 
should provide opposing parties an opportunity to access a forum to resolve 
their dispute in such a way as to minimize expense and delay and that [t]he 
actions of CIGNA have run contrary to the purpose and spirit of arbitration." 
In his brief, Pledger asserts that Cigna has failed to "marshal" the 
evidence in support of the trial court's factual findings and, therefore, the 
findings of the trial court must be upheld by this Court on review. What 
Pledger fails to acknowledge is the fundamental fact that no evidence had 
been presented at the time the trial court denied Cigna's motion for to 
compel arbitration and its motion to set aside the judgment against Mrs. 
Gillespie. The trial court denied those motions based upon representations 
made by counsel in the moving papers filed in connection with those 
motions. The issue presented to the trial court's for decision was a question 
involving procedure - a legal question, not a factual one. 
It was in response to the trial court's ruling, which made factual 
findings when no evidence had been presented, that counsel for Cigna 
2 
submitted an affidavit, signed under oath, made upon counsel's personal 
knowledge of the facts, and supported by documentary evidence. That 
affidavit, the factual allegations of which were and remain uncontroverted 
and unchallenged, is the only evidence in the record. The trial court's 
factual findings cannot be sustained because they are totally unsupported 
by the only evidence in the record. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF CIGNA'S COUNSEL, THE ONLY 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD, DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS 
Pledger takes this Court on a journey through the looking glass in his 
effort to support the factual findings of the Fourth District Court and to refute 
Cigna's absolute statutory right to have this entire, arbitrable case, sent to 
arbitration. By his tactical choice to sue Mrs. Gillespie,1 Pledger preyed 
upon his unknowing patient, suing her for a debt which, by contract, he 
could only collect from Cigna. Pledger sued Mrs. Gillespie for an amount 
1
 Mrs. Gillespie, a WordPerfect Corporation employee, is a plan participant 
in WordPerfect's chosen ERISA health plan, Cigna Health Plan. 
3 
which, again by contract, he was not entitled to seek. Dr. Pledger also took 
advantage of the fact that Mrs. Gillespie was understandably ignorant of 
even the existence of the contractual agreement between Pledger and 
Cigna, far less the terms and conditions of that agreement, and of the 
defense which that contract allowed Mrs. Gillespie. Pledger slyly avoided 
suing Cigna, which would have triggered Cigna's right of arbitration. 
Mrs. Gillespie, an honest person, (1) knew that she had received 
services from Dr. Pledger; (2) knew that she was a plan participant in her 
employer's ERISA health plan; (3) was totally unaware of the contractual 
agreement between Dr. Pledger and Cigna and of the limitations it imposed 
on Dr. Pledger; and (4) believed that Dr. Pledger was entitled to receive for 
those services the sum he was requesting, as opposed to the sum he was 
contractually entitled to receive for those services under the terms of his 
contract with Cigna. In these circumstances, Mrs. Gillespie was unaware 
of any defense to offer in opposition to Dr. Pledger's motion for summary 
judgment. 
The trial court, having just granted Mrs. Gillespie's motion to join Cigna 
4 
as a third-party defendant, entered summary judgment against Mrs. 
Gillespie with near-lightening speed2 based upon Dr. Pledger's fraud, 
without ever considering the issue of the applicability of the Utah Arbitration 
Act to the entire claim.3 
Five months after the trial court entered judgment against Mrs. 
Gillespie,4 Cigna was served with the third-party complaint and it initiated 
efforts, in accordance with the terms of its contract with Dr. Pledger, to seek 
resolution of the dispute outside of any judicial forum. Cigna obtained an 
agreement from Mrs. Gillespie that Cigna need not respond to the third-party 
complaint until it appeared that there was no hope of an economical, 
negotiated resolution. Dr. Pledger's brief is silent on his involvement in this 
process, but the affidavit of Cigna's counsel, the only evidence in the 
record, is not. Because the facts in that affidavit remain uncontroverted, the 
2
 Notice of entry of the judgment was mailed to Mrs. Gillespie, but not 
to Cigna. R. 201, U 3; R. 60-63. 
3
 Effective July 1,1996, the circuit court in which this action was filed 
in 1994, was merged into the district court for the Fourth Judicial District. Utah 
Code Ann. §78-1-2. 
4
 Judgment was entered against Mrs. Gillespie May 6,1994, R. 62, and 
Cigna was served with process on August 2,1994. R. 190. 
5 
motion presents a legal issue. 
Cigna's counsel informed counsel both for Mrs. Gillespie and Dr. 
Pledger that Dr. Pledger was contractually precluded from bringing suit 
against her to collect his fees for services rendered to her as a plan 
participant, a fact of which Mrs. Gillespie's counsel was unaware until that 
time. R. 200-201, U 6. A copy of the agreement was sent to Dr. Pledger's 
attorney at that same time, placing him on notice that Cigna intended to 
enforce its right to arbitrate the dispute.5 R. 173. 
An additional delay was caused when Dr. Pledger belatedly claimed 
that the services he provided to Mrs. Gillespie (and for which he sued her) 
5
 That Dr. Pledger was aware of Cigna's involvement and that he 
actively participated in the lengthy negotiations finds further support in the record. 
Having obtained judgment against Mrs. Gillespie, Dr. Pledger filed a motion in 
supplemental proceedings seeking to examine Mrs. Gillespie concerning her 
property. The trial court's order on that motion issued on May 5, 1994, and Mrs. 
Gillespie was to appear on August 23,1994. R. 67-68. Mrs. Gillespie was served 
with the order on July 20,1994. R. 66. After Cigna was served, the hearing was 
continued pursuant to notice filed by Dr. Pledger's counsel to October 11,1994 
(R. 69), was continued again to November 8, 1994 in the same manner (R. 75-
76), was continued again to January 10,1995 (R. 78-79). Had Dr. Pledger felt he 
was being prejudiced, he could have, at any time, ceased his participation in the 
negotiations and proceeded to execute on his judgment. Sufficient time had 
apparently not elapsed for Dr. Pledger to feel confident of prevailing on his waiver 
and laches claims. 
6 
were provided by him in 1994, after he had terminated his contract with 
Cigna, R. 169, rather than in 1993, which his complaint alleged, and when 
he was bound by his Cigna contract. Cigna embarked upon an exhaustive 
search down that rabbit trail, to discover that the only records in Cigna's 
possession showing services from Dr. Pledger to Mrs. Gillespie reflected 
services rendered in 1993, while Dr. Pledger was still a contracting 
physician with Cigna. Dr. Pledger, for his part, never once provided a 
document to support his disingenuous contention.6 
The trial court failed utterly to acknowledge that, after Cigna made the 
determination that its contract indeed bound Dr. Pledger because services 
in fact were rendered in 1993, Cigna placed Dr. Pledger on notice that it 
would hold him to his contractual agreement to arbitrate, and seek damages 
from him for his violation of his participating physician agreement by suing 
the unfortunate Mrs. Gillespie, unless he complied with Cigna's written 
6
 The trial court found that services were provided in March of 1993. 
R. 267. Counsel for Dr. Pledger advised counsel for Cigna that Dr. Pledger had 
terminated his contract in October of 1993. R. 169. Even under the most 
charitable of interpretations, the contract between Dr. Pledger and Cigna was in 
full force and effect at the time services were rendered to Mrs. Gillespie. 
7 
demand that he voluntarily set aside the judgment against her and arbitrate 
his claim with Cigna. R. 166-167. 
Some further efforts to settle the matter were had. Dr. Pledger 
changed counsel and a final effort at settlement failed. Cigna then began 
to prepare its Motion to Compel Arbitration of the arbitrable dispute, in 
accordance with its contractual right and notice previously given to Pledger. 
A procedural complication existed because Dr. Pledger had obtained a 
judgment against Mrs. Gillespie by reason of her ignorance of defenses 
available to her and Cigna's contract which made the dispute arbitrable. 
Had Dr. Pledger been forthright with Mrs. Gillespie and the trial court, rather 
than seeking judgment and refusing to set that judgment aside, as 
demanded by Cigna in conformity with the terms of the contract, Mrs. 
Gillespie would have been in a position to raise the existence of the contract 
as a defense, and the judgment would not have been entered. 
Cigna determined that the entire dispute was arbitrable, that the 
summary judgment against Mrs. Gillespie was a matter subject to 
arbitration, and that a motion to set aside that judgment so that arbitration 
8 
could proceed would be appropriate7 so that Pledger's prior improper 
conduct would not serve to thwart the state's policy in favor of arbitration. 
See Sam Reisfield & Sons Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th 
Cir. 1976). The first action taken by Cigna in this lawsuit was the filing of its 
Motion to Compel Arbitration, followed by its filing of a motion to set aside 
the judgment against Mrs. Gillespie, to facilitate that arbitration. 
It is worthy of note that the uncontroverted facts show that Cigna's 
virtually immediate response to the letter sent by Mrs. Gillespie's counsel to 
it, at a New Mexico office (not its legal department) was to investigate the 
situation, determine that some additional monies were owing to Dr. Pledger 
under his contract with Cigna, and immediately to pay those additional 
sums. Cigna took these actions before Dr. Pledger sought summary 
judgment. Undaunted either by his contract with Cigna or his receipt of 
7
 The United States Court of Appeals has recognized that claims 
against non-parties to the arbitration agreement are arbitrable where "based on 
the same facts and Q inherently inseparable." J. J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone 
Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 1988). Here, claims based 
upon services provided to Mrs. Gillespie by a participating physician, Dr. Pledger, 
must be arbitrated. Therefore, the judgment should be set aside to facilitate that 
arbitration, despite Dr. Pledger's refusal to voluntarily set aside the judgment. 
9 
payment in full under that contract, Dr. Pledger still proceeded with his effort 
to defraud the court into giving him a judgment against the innocent Mrs. 
Gillespie. 
It is that same Dr. Pledger who convinced the trial court, no doubt itself 
embarrassed by the situation and seeking someone to blame, that some 
undefined delay by Cigna in filing its Motion to Compel Arbitration had 
prejudiced Dr. Pledger in some undefined way. In his opposition to Cigna's 
Motion to Compel Arbitration, Dr. Pledger again conveniently omitted the 
true state of the facts - there had been consistent communication 
concerning the facts of the situation and efforts to find some way to settle for 
a two-year period involving Dr. Pledger (through Ray Harding, his then legal 
counsel) and even more salient, that Dr. Pledger had clearly been placed on 
notice by Cigna that it intended to proceed in accordance with its rights 
under the contract if Dr. Pledger would not voluntarily comply with its 
demands in March of 1995. That fact is uncontroverted. 
Dr. Pledger alleges that, to prevail on its challenge to the "factual 
findings" of the trial court, Cigna must show 
10 
(1) that the trial court's factual findings as to Cigna's 
knowledge of its claimed right to arbitration, its 
knowledge of the claim by Dr. Pledger against 
Cigna's insured, Mrs. Gillespie, and its intentional 
inaction in the fact of that knowledge are clearly 
erroneous, and (2) that the court erred in concluding 
that by its deliberate inaction over more than a two-
year period, Cigna relinquished its right to compel 
arbitration. 
Brief of Appellee at 10. 
Cigna has done precisely that. Cigna has demonstrated that the 
evidence before the trial court, the uncontroverted affidavit of Cigna's 
counsel, did not evidence "intentional inaction" or "deliberate inaction," but 
a pattern of conduct focused toward the economical and non-judicial 
resolution of the dispute - a process in which Dr. Pledger fully, willingly, and 
knowingly participated. If estoppel is appropriately applied to anyone, it 
should be applied to Dr. Pledger. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE ERRONEOUS FACTUAL FINDINGS 
IN THE CONTEXT OF A HEARING ON PROCEDURAL 
ISSUES AND THEN IGNORED THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
ON CIGNA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
The issue of any potential prejudice to Mrs. Gillespie was not before 
the trial court at the hearing on Cigna's motions to compel arbitration and to 
set aside the judgment. The matter presented for resolution was purely 
legal and procedural in nature. Nevertheless, the trial court, apparently 
aware that there was no prejudice to Dr. Pledger, seized upon some sua 
sponte notion that Mrs. Gillespie had been prejudiced by Cigna (rather than 
by Dr. Pledger's fraud). Mrs. Gillespie, recognizing that she was a victim of 
Dr. Pledger's fraud, has never made that claim. Nevertheless, in 
contravention of Utah law, and based upon the point imagined by the trial 
court that Mrs. Gillespie was prejudiced at the hands of Cigna, an issue as 
to which no prior notice was given, the Court denied Cigna's motions. 
The trial court had only short weeks prior to that hearing been 
transformed from a circuit court, which did not have jurisdiction over motions 
to compel arbitration, to a district court and presumably was addressing the 
12 
issue of arbitration for the first time. Because the trial court had made 
factual findings which were completely at odds with the facts as they actually 
existed, Cigna moved for reconsideration and provided a factual record in 
the form of the affidavit of Cigna's counsel.8 That affidavit, completely 
uncontroverted, stands as the only factual record. Ignoring the only 
evidence as to the facts, the trial court again denied Cigna's motions, relying 
on wholly infirm legal grounds. 
Now, before this Court, Dr. Pledger seeks yet again to mislead. His 
arguments suggest that, despite controlling case law concerning the 
standard of review for appeal of a denial of a motion to compel arbitration, 
Soza v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996), the correction of error standard 
mandated in that case does not apply because the trial court signed a 
document purporting to find facts and, therefore, an abuse of discretion 
standard applies. See, Brief of Appellee at 3. That contention is 
disingenuous not only because of the controlling case law, but also because 
there was never any evidentiary hearing. The only form of evidence 
8
 A complete copy of the affidavit and all exhibits is appended to this 
Reply Brief as Appendix 1. 
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submitted to the trial court was on the Motion for Reconsideration, the 
affidavit of Cigna's counsel, which was, and remains, absolutely 
uncontroverted. The issue before this Court is, therefore, purely a legal 
issue to be resolved applying a correction of error standard. 
Dr. Pledger's argument that a motion to set aside a judgment is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard presents at least a colorable 
effort to attain that standard. What Dr. Pledger misses in addressing that 
issue is that the "judgment" entered by the trial court relates to a dispute 
which is subject to a mandatory arbitration provision in a contract between 
Dr. Pledger and Cigna, not between Dr. Pledger and Mrs. Gillespie. Thus, 
although the trial court entered a judgment before Cigna was served with the 
third-party complaint, the issue again falls under the umbrella of the Utah 
Arbitration Act. Procedurally, the judgment must be set aside so that the 
entire dispute can be sent to arbitration as Dr. Pledger knows it should be. 
The fact that Dr. Pledger committed a fraud upon the trial court to 
obtain a judgment before Cigna was served was simply a tactical strategy 
by which Dr. Pledger sought to avoid the arbitration contract by which he is 
14 
bound. The failure of the trial court to recognize that chicanery has done 
undeniable violence to the clearly expressed intent of the Utah legislature 
and the Utah Arbitration Act to enforce such provisions.9 This Court should 
remedy that error. 
Ever willing to mislead, Dr. Pledger suggests to this Court that Cigna 
had a duty to "marshal" the evidence simply because the Court signed a 
document entitled "Findings of Fact." However, Utah courts have historically 
ignored the titles of documents and looked, instead, at their substance. At 
the time the trial court signed the "findings of fact", no evidence had been 
presented other than the moving papers. Cigna's Motion for 
Reconsideration was accompanied by evidence in the form of an affidavit, 
which recites sworn facts that are uncontroverted. 
Despite the fact that this was the first evidence presented to it, the trial 
9
 Cigna notes here expressly what is implicit in the relief it sought 
below, that it is an indispensable party to the dispute. Cigna is not an insurance 
company with which Mrs. Gillespie has an insurance policy. Instead, Cigna is the 
primary contracting party with the health care provider, Dr. Pledger, who provided 
services to a Cigna Health Plan participant under that contract. It is Cigna's 
contract which is the subject of litigation. Mrs. Gillespie had no contract with Dr. 
Pledger, other than derivatively through Cigna. 
15 
court chose to retreat to its earlier ruling which was based on no evidence 
at all. Dr. Pledger's suggestion that evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings should be "marshaled" when none was submitted by Dr. Pledger or 
that Cigna is arguing the "weight" of evidence, when the only evidence that 
was submitted was an uncontroverted affidavit and supporting exhibits, is 
disingenuous. If there was evidence to "weigh" the trial court should have 
ordered an evidentiary hearing. The evidence, as contained in an 
uncontroverted affidavit, however, does not require an evidentiary hearing. 
Dr. Pledger also attempts to mislead this Court by suggesting that "the 
record reveals that [the issue of whether Dr. Pledger was subject to a 
participating physician agreement] was in dispute." Brief of Appellee at 5. 
Notably, Dr. Pledger finds himself unable to cite to any portion of the record 
which "reveals" any such thing.10 
10
 Indeed, Dr. Pledger's "Statement of the Facts" appearing on pages 
6-8 also reveals no basis for that claim. What the record does reveal, in the form 
of Cigna's counsel's affidavit, is that Dr. Pledger at one point claimed, contrary to 
the allegations of his own complaint, that he had provided his services to Mrs. 
Gillespie in 1994 after he had terminated his participating physician agreement. 
The affidavit also reveals, without being controverted, that the only records of any 
services provided by Dr. Pledger to Mrs. Gillespie show clearly, unequivocally, 
absolutely, incontrovertibly and irrefutably, that the services were provided in 1993 
while Dr. Pledger was bound by his contract with Cigna - and the trial court so 
16 
It is in that light and against that background that Dr. Pledger comes 
to this Court with his claim that Cigna did nothing, without mentioning what 
Cigna was doing and when Dr. Pledger was put on notice of Cigna's intent 
to enforce its contract, as revealed in Cigna's counsel's affidavit, and which 
is uncontroverted. Also in this light and against this background Dr. Pledger 
comes to this Court and suggests that the relief Cigna seeks would cause 
prejudice to Mrs. Gillespie, and not Dr. Pledger, and Cigna should be 
precluded from enforcing its rights under its contract with Dr. Pledger -
although Mrs. Gillespie herself has never opposed the relief Cigna requests. 
Further in this light and against this background, Dr. Pledger argues that 
Chandler v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), 
actually supports the trial court's ruling, even though, under the plain holding 
of Chandler, the Utah Supreme Court held that "prejudice" must be derived 
from participation in the litigation in order to support a finding that a party 
to a mandatory arbitration agreement cannot force a party in breach of that 
agreement to the arbitration forum to deal with the dispute. Finally, in that 
found. R. 267. 
17 
light and against that background, that Dr. Pledger suggests that the trial 
court properly refrained from setting aside the summary judgment it entered 
as a result of Dr. Pledger's own fraud, and in violation of a mandatory 
arbitration clause to which Dr. Pledger was bound. 
In the full context, Dr. Pledger's arguments are revealed to be 
unworthy of consideration. He agreed to arbitrate and his victimization of 
Mrs. Gillespie and fraud upon the trial court do not alter his duty to arbitrate. 
POINT III 
THE AUTHORITY CITED BY DR. PLEDGER IS 
INAPPOSITE TO THE FACT SITUATION PRESENTED 
TO THIS COURT FOR REVIEW 
In support of his arguments, Dr. Pledger refers this Court to numerous 
authorities. Some of the cases cited were discussed in Cigna's opening 
brief and will not be revisited here. Some comment is appropriate, however, 
particularly concerning Dr. Pledger's interpretation of the marshaling 
requirement as it relates to a challenge to a trial court's factual finding. 
The authorities upon which Dr. Pledger relies upheld the factual 
findings of a trial court, jury, or administrative agency after the presentation 
18 
of evidence by all parties at trial or an evidentiary hearing.11 Dr. Pledger 
correctly notes that the fundamental principle behind the deference 
accorded a fact-finder is the personal contact the fact-finder has at trial to 
assess the credibility of the witnesses and give appropriate weight to the 
evidence presented. That principle simply does not come into play here. 
Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Pledger, the only 
evidence presented establishes that Cigna did not "sit on its rights" in a 
petulant display of willful and deliberate inaction. The affidavit establishes 
that Cigna (1) engaged in a consistent effort to resolve the dispute outside 
the judicial forum, as it was contractually obligated to do, (2) placed Dr. 
Pledger on notice of its intention to hold him to his contract and all its terms 
and conditions, including arbitration, (3) investigated Dr. Pledger's claims as 
11
 State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) (deference given to trial 
court in criminal prosecution to assess witnesses' credibility in ruling on motion to 
suppress); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990) (marshaling 
requirements on appeal of a jury criminal conviction); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha 
Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989) (challenge to factual findings after bench trial 
in constructive eviction case); Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 916 P.2d 
344 (Utah 1996) (challenge to factual findings of administrative agency in context 
of specialized fact-finding expertise); Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1983) (factual findings challenged based upon weight given to conflicting 
expert opinions). 
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to the time his participating physician's contract was terminated and the 
impact of that termination on the claims relating to Mrs. Gillespie; (4) 
allowed Dr. Pledger ample opportunity to furnish Cigna with documentary 
evidence to substantiate his position; and (5) resorted to the trial court only 
when all its efforts to avoid the litigation had proved unsuccessful. Dr. 
Pledger did not submit an affidavit contesting any of these sworn factual 
statements. The documents supporting the affidavit speak for themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts, for purposes of the motion to compel arbitration and to set 
aside the judgment against Mrs. Gillespie, were exactly as Cigna has 
represented them. These facts, even when considered in the light most 
favorable to Dr. Pledger, cannot be interpreted to support the trial court's 
finding of waiver, estoppel, and laches. Cigna has marshaled the evidence, 
established the facts, and the facts do not and simply cannot support the 
trial court's ruling. 
For these reasons, the trial court must be reversed and the motions 
to compel arbitration and to vacate the judgment against Mrs. Gillespie 
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granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of September 1997 
ARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & RETERS 
DAVrD W. SCOFI 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant were delivered by United States mail, 
first class, postage prepaid, this 22nd day of September, 1997, to the 
following: 
Donald E. McCandless 
FISHER SCRIBNER & STIRLAND 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84504 
Attorneys for Ople Gillespie 
C. Val Morley 
Laramie D. Merritt 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Attorneys for Charles Pledger 
ID W. SCOFIELD 
September 22, 1997 - 34565 04 Q r\ 
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PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS U£C 3 II W £j '$3 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
-00O00- -
CHARLES V. PLEDGER, M.D., : 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, DAVID W. SCOFIELD 
-vs- : 
: Case No. 940000083 CV 
OPLE GILLESPIE, : 
: Hon. John C. Backlund 
Defendant and : 
Third-Party Plaintiff, : 
-vs- : 
CIGNA HEALTHPLAN, : 
Third-Party Defendant. : 
-00O00- -
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1. I am the attorney for Third-Party Defendant CIGNA Healthplan ("CIGNA"), \\ hich 
was joined to this action as a party by virtue of the Court's Order dated April 12. 1994, a genuine 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A." 
2. The Court entered judgment against defendant Ople Gillespie herein upon the 
granting of a motion for summary judgment, on May 6, 1994. 
3. Notice of that judgment was served upon Mrs. Gillespie, but not upon CIGNA, on 
May 11,994. 
4. Third-party defendant CIGNA was served with process for the first time on August 
2, 1994. See copy of summons served upon CIGNA, attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
5. CIGNA hired me to investigate and respond to the Third-Party Complaint, as 
appropriate, within the 40 days allowed under the summons. Paragraph J, on page 10 of the 
Participating Physician Agreement between CIGNA and Dr. Pledger, a genuine copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit "C", requires a good faith effort to resolve any problems or disputes, and 
mandatory binding arbitration if those settlement efforts fail. 
6. On September 15, 1994,1 had a conversation with Grant Moody, attorney for Mrs. 
Gillespie, wherein we discussed the case. I told Mr. Moody that I was trying to obtain the records 
concerning the claim from CIGNA, that the information that I had received to date indicated that 
CIGNA had already paid Mrs. Gillespie's medical bills in full under the plan, but that in any event 
there existed a participating physician agreement between Dr. Pledger and CIGNA which absolutely 
precluded the action taken by Dr. Pledger to obtain a judgment against Mrs. Gillespie, a plan 
participant. I also informed Mr. Moody that, in light of the clear language in the physician 
agreement, I felt it would be possible to settle by having Dr. Pledger agree to set aside his judgment 
and, if he had any remaining complaint, to pursue his remedies under the physician agreement. To 
that end, I sent Ray Harding, who was the attorney for Dr. Pledger, a copy of the applicable language 
of the physician agreement which absolutely precluded the filing or pursuit of any suit against Mrs. 
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Gillespie by Dr. Pledger. Mr. Moody indicated to me in that conversation that he had been unaware 
of the physician agreement. A genuine copy of my letter to Mr. Moody dated September 15, 1994 
is attached as Exhibit "D" hereto. 
7. As disclosed in that letter, Mr. Moody, on behalf of Mrs. Gillespie, agreed with me, 
on behalf of CIGNA, that CIGNA would not need to respond to the Third-Party Complaint in this 
case, so long as efforts to settle without the expenditure of attorneys1 fees were made, in light of the 
clear breach by Dr. Pledger of his contract with CIGNA in pursuing Mrs. Gillespie, rather than 
making a claim to CIGNA, if Dr. Pledger believed additional payments were owing. 
8. After I provided Mr. Harding with a copy of the physician agreement, Mr. Harding 
also wanted information concerning records showing payments made to Dr. Pledger by CIGNA . 
9. On November 7,1994,1 transmitted to Mr. Harding a letter indicating that CIGNAs 
records showed that Dr. Pledger had been paid $916.57 on Mrs. Gillespie's claim and, under the 
terms of his physician agreement, that was the amount of payment he was entitled to for the plastic 
surgery procedure performed on Mrs. Gillespie's jaw, despite his $3,400.00 charges. 
10. I later had a telephone conversation with Mr. Harding where he indicated to me that 
Dr. Pledger's claim appeared to be for charges in 1994, at a point and time after which Dr. Pledger 
had terminated his relationship with CIGNA, and that is why his client felt he could pursue the entire 
amount of the charges. Mr. Harding also transmitted to me a letter he had which apparently had 
been transmitted by the CIGNA Customer Satisfaction Manager to Mrs. Gillespie on July 28, 1 004. 
showing that part of the payment made to Dr. Pledger was made after CIGNA had received the letter 
from Mrs. Gillespie's counsel the Court referred to in the prior hearing, asking CIGNA to inv estigate 
Dr. Pledger's claim. See Exhibit "E", attached. 
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11. By that point, Dr. Pledger had been paid in full for his claim and should have notified 
the Court voluntarily to, set aside his judgment and left Mrs. Gillespie alone. Instead, Mrs. Gillespie 
had been unknown, to me, brought in for a Supp. Order on November 15, 1994, after Dr. Pledger 
had been paid in full by CIGNA. 
12. I made further investigations to determine whether CIGNA had received any claim 
of Dr. Pledger for services rendered to Mrs. Gillespie in 1994, as well as to obtain Dr. Pledger's 
entire file. 
13. I was then informed by Mrs. Gillespie's counsel that Mrs. Gillespie was scheduled 
to go in for Supplemental Proceedings on December 13. I contacted Mr. Harding and asked him to 
agree to postpone the Supplemental Proceedings until we could resolve whether there were any 
charges incurred by Mrs. Gillespie in 1994 with Dr. Pledger, and I asked Mr. Harding for a copy of 
Dr. Pledger's termination letter with CIGNA. Mr. Harding agreed to continue the Supplemental 
Proceedings and sent me a Notice of Continuance dated December 12, 1994. 
14. In January, 1995, the investigation was ongoing, although I did have contact with Mr. 
Harding in which I suggested to him that his client should have records which would assist as well 
in resolving these issues, and requested that his client cease all actions against Mrs. Gillespie until 
the factual issues could be resolved and settlement appropriately pursued. 
15. On January 13, 1995, Mr. Harding transmitted to me a copy of Dr. Pledger's 
ostensible termination letter, a genuine copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "F." 
16. Finally, after receiving Dr. Pledger's file, and after an exhaustive search of tneir 
records by CIGNA, it was confirmed that there were no claims for services rendered to Mrs. 
Gillespie by Dr. Pledger in 1994, that all such services were provided to Mrs. Gillespie by Dr. 
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Pledger in March of 1993, while he clearly was bound by his participating physician agreement with 
CIGNA, and that all sums owing to Dr. Pledger in accordance with his agreement with CIGNA had 
been paid. Thus, based on the information available to me, Dr. Pledger was liable for his breach of 
contract to Mrs. Gillespie for all of her attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred, as well as to 
CIGNA, for all of its attorneys1 fees, costs and expenses incurred. I therefore transmitted a letter to 
Mr. Harding on March 13, 1995, demanding that Dr. Pledger immediately cease from proceeding 
with his lawsuit, stipulate to set aside the judgment and dismiss without prejudice, and seek to 
arbitrate any dispute he might have in accordance with the agreement. A genuine copy of that letter 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "G." 
17. The only contingency in that demand was in the event that Dr. Pledger could provide 
documentation different from that available to CIGNA, which has never been produced. 
18. Efforts to settle the matter continued, with correspondence from Mr. Harding to Mr. 
Moody and me on March 21, 1995, which, after careful evaluation, was unacceptable to CIGNA. 
Without going into the details of the offer, CIGNA demanded that Dr. Pledger make Mrs. Gillespie 
whole for the expenses Dr. Pledger improperly imposed upon her. Dr. Pledger refused to pay the 
expenses he had wrongfully imposed upon Mrs. Gillespie. 
19. I explored with Mrs. Gillespiefs counsel whether she would be willing to bear her own 
expenses and was informed that she unwilling to do so. In light of the fact that these expenses were 
incurred by virtue of Dr. Pledger's breach of his agreement, CIGNA concurred with Mrs. Gillespie 
that she should not bear that expense. CIGNA investigated further, with counsel for Mrs. Giiiespie, 
the total amount of expenses she had incurred in the matter and received, in mid-January 1996, a 
total expenditure for attorneys' fees and costs. 
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20. By that time, Mr. Harding had withdrawn as counsel for Dr. Pledger and Mr. Morley 
had replaced him. It was apparent that Dr. Pledger was unwilling to contribute anything of a 
substantial nature towards making Mrs. Gillespie whole. 
21. By February 7,1996, it was clear that settlement would not be possible between the 
parties, and I wrote a letter to the clerk of the Fourth Circuit Court requesting copies of those papers 
and pleadings which had been filed and appeared to be necessary for the purpose of reviewing the 
issues and preparing a motion to compel arbitration. A genuine copy of that letter is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "H." After receiving and reviewing all of that documentation, I recommended to CIGNA 
that it pursue its rights against Dr. Pledger under its contract with him. Unfortunately, Dr. Pledger's 
fraud upon the Court had resulted in a judgment being entered against Mrs. Gillespie, making the 
issues procedurally more complicated. While my March 1995 demand had been complied with to 
the extent that no further orders in supplemental proceedings were being served on Mrs. Gillespie, 
so as to further increase Dr. Pledger's exposure, it was procedurally a unique posture to move to 
compel arbitration of a case where a judgment had been entered prior to both the effectuation of 
service upon CIGNA and the disclosure to Mrs. Gillespie that a binding arbitration provision existed 
in Dr. Pledger's contract which precluded Dr. Pledger from ever filing suit. 
22. In May of 1996,1 determined that the judgment rightfully should be set aside and that 
CIGNA would be required to appear in the case through a motion to compel arbitration combined 
with a motion to set aside judgment. Initial drafts of papers for that purpose were prepared by a legal 
assistant in my office in May of 1996. 
23. My time in the month of June 1996 was consumed in large part by preparation for 
and appearance at a federal jury trial in Houston, followed by preparation for and a trial before Judge 
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Wilkinson in Salt Lake County in July. 
24. On August 14, 1996,1 received a letter from Mr. McCandless indicating that Dr. 
Pledger's wrongful judgment was impeding his client in obtaining a loan. I finalized the motion to 
compel arbitration and motion to set aside judgment and caused it to be filed at the end of August. 
25. At no time has CIGNA been insensitive to the plight of Mrs. Gillespie. Instead, 
repeated demands have been made upon Dr. Pledger to honor his agreement and to leave Mrs. 
Gillespie alone. Indeed, demand was made upon Dr. Pledger, in March 1995, to stipulate to set aside 
his wrongful judgment and to cease pursuing it. Not only did Dr. Pledger violate his agreement with 
CIGNA by filing suit against Mrs. Gillespie rather than arbitrate his claim with CIGNA, he violated 
his agreement by failing to attempt to negotiate a resolution in good faith before taking any action, 
as his contract required him to do. 
26. CIGNA is, has been and will continue to be, supportive of Mrs. Gillespie's position 
in this matter. Mrs. Gillespie, by agreeing to an open-ended extension of time while CIGNA 
attempted, as its contract with Dr. Pledger requires it to do, to make a good faith effort to resolve this 
matter, has recognized that CIGNA has been continually attempting to resolve the matter in her 
interest. If Mrs. Gillespie has been injured beyond her attorneys' fees and costs in this matter she, as 
an intended third-party beneficiary of the CIGNA participating physician agreement with Dr. Pledger, 
also has a cause of action against Dr. Pledger for breach of that agreement, which claim is arbitrable. 
The fact that Dr. Pledger concealed the existence of the agreement from Mrs. Gillespie, in an apparent 
attempt to hide her legitimate defenses to his complaint is no reason for this Court to punish her and 
CIGNA, while rewarding Dr. Pledger for his misconduct. 
27. The allegations of Dr. Pledger, even in the settlement period, have always been 
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unsupported by proper documentation. Nevertheless, CIGNA made a good faith effort to 
exhaustively search all of its records to determine, whether, in fact, Dr. Pledger's claims had any 
merit. These searches were being made for documents that, CIGNA determined, did not exist 
concerning Dr. Pledger's claim that he provided services to Mrs. Gillespie in 1994. Indeed, Dr. 
Pledger never has produced any documents to support that claim and CIGNA concluded finally that 
the only services rendered by Dr. Pledger to Mrs. Gillespie which it had records of were those in 
1993, for which payment in full has been made. CIGNA therefore objects to any consideration of its 
motion to compel arbitration out of the context of Dr. Pledger's agreement, his failure to disclose its 
existence to the Court and Mrs. Gillespie, his failure to withdraw his judgment after it was clear he 
was paid in fall, and his failure to compensate Mrs. Gillespie for damages he caused to her in breach 
of the agreement, of which she is an intended third-party beneficiary. 
& PETERS 
DATED this4_ diY of December, 1996. 
DAVI0 W. SCOFIELD ^ l 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this^%ay of December, 1996. 
1 / ^ ^ ^ ! ^ Notaiy Public • RUTH A FAIRBANKS | 
My Commission Expires: 
£-,30 
ion cxpi 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing toCSfO^afoCtJ, <.//• 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct c9Qlfi^Q foregoing Affidavit was 
delivered by United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, thi»J^aay'of December, 1996, to the 
following: 
Donald E. McCandless 
Fisher, Scribner, Moody & Stirland 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Fax: 801/375-5607 
Attorney for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
C. Val Morley 
Jerry Schollian 
Duval, Hansen, Witt & Morley 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
785-0853 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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J. GRANT MOODY, 6282 
DARWIN C. FISHER, 1080 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C. 
2696 No. University Ave., Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
CHARLES V. PLEDGER, M.D., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OPLE GILLESPIE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO 
FILE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 940000083 
This matter having come before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion to Bring Third Party Complaint and accompanying 
memoranda, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and 
good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Bring Third 
Party Complaint is granted. * /? 
DATED t h i s 72- day o f -Ma*Gh, 1 9 9 4 . 
, ,77'*-' ---S5>^ 
BY THE COURT: $ 
/ # , ?/ 
EXHIBITA 
CIRCUIT/ COURT JUDGE'..^;^^.JV 
112-
' . 
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J. GRANT MOODY, 6282 
DARWIN C. FISHER, 1080 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C. 
2696 No. University Ave., Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
CHARLES V. PLEDGER, M.D. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OPLE GILLESPIE, 
Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CIGNA HEALTHPLAN, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
S U M M O N S 
Civil No. 940000083 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file with the Clerk of 
the above-entitled Court at 98 North Center, American Fork, UT 
84003, an Answer in writing to a Third-Party Complaint filed in the 
above-entitled case and to serve upon, or mail to J. Grant Moody, 
Third-Party Plaintiff's Attorney, 2696 North University Avenue, 
Suite 200, Provo, UT 84604, a copy of said Answer within forty 
EXHIBITB 
(40) days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, a copy of 
which is attached hereto and served herewith. 
DATED this ;</ day of July, 1994. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C. 
BY: ^- ^ g r - ^ <3>^ V 
J. GRANT MOODY 
Attorney for Third-Party Plaintiff 
Serve Defendant at: 
CIGNA Healthcare of Utah 
James J. Horn, Reg. Agt 
5292 South 320 West #280 
Salt Lake City, DT 
2 
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CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
MANAGED CARE ARRANGEMENT 
PARTICIPATING PHYSICIAN AGREEMENT 
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company ("CIGNA") and the Physician ("Physician") whose 
name appears below agree as follows: 
I. PURPOSE 
WHEREAS, CIGNA has or will enter into agreements, directly or indirectly, with other 
Payors to establish and maintain a network of healthcare providers to accept 
reimbursement for healthcare services obtained by Members at predetermined rates, and 
WHEREAS. Payors have established or insured Plans for insureds, employees, their 
dependents and other persons, under which Payors will fund, administer or insure 
healthcare expenses of Members at previously determined rates; and 
WHEREAS, Payors have contracted with CIGNA to establish, maintain or administer the 
Managed Care Arrangement for such Plans; and 
WHEREAS, Physician is a physician duly licensed by the appropriate physician licensing 
authority within the State of Utah; and 
WHEREAS, Physician wishes to participate in the Managed Care Arrangement established 
by CIGNA; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements contained 
herein, it is understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto as follows 
II. DEFINITIONS 
A. "Hospital Services" means inpanent and hospital outpatient services which are 
covered by Plans 
B "Managed Care Arrangement" ("MCA") means the set of agreements between CIGNA, 
Payors and Participating Providers, including Plan. 
C "Medically Necessary" means services or supplies which, under the provisions of tms 
Agreement, are determined by CIGNA under its Utilization Management program, 
to be-
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1. Appropriate and necessary for the symptoms, diagnosis or treatment of the 
medical condition; and 
2. Provided for diagnosis or direct care and treatment of the medical condition; 
and 
3. Within standards of good medical practice within the organized medical 
community; and 
4. Not primarily for the convenience of the Member, the Member's physician or 
another provider: and 
5. The most appropriate supply or level of service which can safely be provided. 
For hospital stays, this means that acute care as an inpatient is necessary due 
to the kind of services the Member is receiving or the severity of the Member's 
condition, and that safe and adequate care cannot be received as an outpatient 
or in a less intensified medical setting. 
D. "Member" means a person who is eligible for benefits under the Plan. 
E. "Participating Hospital" means a Hospital which has entered into an agreement with 
CIGNA to accept a negotiated fee for Hospital Services obtained by Members. 
F. "Participating Physician" means a Physician who has entered into an agreement with 
CIGNA regarding compensation for health care services provided to Members. 
Physician is a health care provider duly licensed by the appropriate physician 
licensing authority within the State of Utah. 
G. "Participating Provider" means a Hospital ("Participating Hospital"), other health 
facility, Physician ("Participating Physician") or other health professional wmcn nas 
entered into an agreement with CIGNA to accept prospectively determined rates as 
reimbursement in full for charges made to Members for Provider Services. 
H. "Payor" means an insurer, employer, or other entity which funds, administers or 
insures Plan and which has agreed to act as Payor under this Agreement. 
I. "Plan" means the healthcare plan or program arranged or administered by Payor for 
employees, spouses and dependents and other specified persons. 
J. "Provider Services" means those services provided by a Participating Physician 
("Physician Services"), Participating Hospital ("Hospital Services"), or otner 
Participating Provider and covered by a Plan. 
K. "Utilization Management" means a function performed by CIGNA or its designee to 
review and certify whether certain Provider Services provided, or to be provided, are 
Medically Necessary. 
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REIATTONSHTP BETWEEN CIGNA AND PHYSICIAN 
A. CIGNA and Physician are independent entities. Nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed or be deemed to create between CIGNA and Physician a relationship of 
employer and employee or principal and agent or any relationship other than that 
of independent parties contracting with each other solely for the purpose of carrying 
out the provisions of this Agreement. 
B. This Agreement in no way alters or attempts to alter the normal patient/physician 
relationship. This Agreement is solely for the purpose of establishing an alternate 
funding arrangement for reimbursement of medical expenses of Members. This 
Agreement creates no obligation for Physician to provide medical care nor for 
Physician to. in any way, alter his standards of medical care. 
C. Physician agrees not to allow Utilization Management determinations or other terms 
and conditions of this Agreement to alter or affect his medical judgment in 
providing medical care or to affect the physiciaapatient relationship. 
PHYSICIAN RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. Physician agrees to accept the rates set forth in Exhibit A as payment in full for 
Medically Necessary Provider Services obtained K Members from Physician. 
B. Physician agrees to the compensation and billing terms provided for in Article VI. 
C. Physician shall, to the extent possible, seek, accept, and maintain evidence of 
assignment of benefits for Provider Services obtained by Member from Physician. 
D. Physician agrees to admit or arrange for admission of Members to Participating 
Hospitals whenever possible and when not inconsistent with the Physician's 
standards of practice. 
E. Physician agrees to refer Members to Participating Providers whenever possible and 
when not inconsistent with Physician's standards of practice. 
F. Physician agrees to participate in Utilization Management provided in Article VII of 
this Agreement and to abide by decisions resulting from that review subject to rights 
of reconsideration and review provided in Section VII.F. 
G. Physician agrees to participate and comply with the Quality Assurance program 
provided for in Article Mil. 
H. Physician has accurately completed a Participating Physician Application. Physician 
shall promptly notify CIGNA, as administrator of the MCA, of any change in the 
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information contained on the Application, including any change in Physicians 
principal place of business, within thirty (30) days of such change. 
I. Physician agrees to maintain admitting privileges at at least one Participating 
Hospital to the extent that hospital admitting privileges are necessary for Physician 
to provide the care Physician is licensed to provide. 
CIGNA RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. CIGNA will contract with Payors who will agree to pay Physician compensation 
pursuant to the provisions of Article VI. 
B. CIGNA agrees to grant Physician the status of Participating Physician, and to identify 
Physician as a Participating Physician on informational materials to Members and 
contract with Payors whose Plans encourage Members' use of Physician through 
benefit incentives. 
C. CIGNA agrees to continue listing Physician as a Participating Physician until this 
Agreement terminates pursuant to Article XI of this Agreement. 
D. CIGNA agrees to provide Physician with a list of all Participating Hospitals and 
Participating Providers. 
E. CIGNA agrees to arrange for Members to be provided appropriate identification 
cards. 
F. CIGNA will provide Physician with materials identifying the provider services covered 
under the appropriate Plans and the manner in which billing of Members will be 
conducted. 
COMPENSATION AND BILLING 
A. Physician agrees to accept as payment in full for charges for Provider Services 
obtained by Members the lower of the Physician's usual and customary charge for 
the service provided or the maximum fee schedule as may be in effect from r4i-r.e to 
time as set forth in Exhibit A hereto. 
B. Payors shall agree to deduct any copayments, coinsurance, or deductible imcur.ts 
required by the Plan from payment due or deductible to Physician. Deduction for 
the copayment. coinsurance or deductible amounts shall be determined on the basis 
of the lower of Physician's actual charges and the fee schedule applicable hereunder. 
C. Physician agrees that the only charges for which a Member may be liable and may 
be billed by Physician shall be for Provider Services not covered by the Plan and for 
copayments. coinsurance, or deductible amounts required by said Plan, or as 
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otherwise provided herein. Physician charges for copayments, coinsurance, and 
deductible amounts shall be based on the lower of Physician's actual charges and 
the fee schedule applicable hereunder. 
D. When Payor is the primary payor under applicable coordination of benefit rules. 
Payor shall agree to pay the amounts due under this Agreement reduced as provided 
in Section VI.B. UTien Payor is other than primary under the applicable 
coordination of benefit rules. Payor shall agree to pay Physician only those amounts 
which when added to amounts due or received by Physician from other sources, 
including copayments provided for in the Plan, equals one hundred percent of the 
amount to which Physician is entitled pursuant to Section VIA. of this Agreement. 
Physician agrees to collect the amounts due Physician, from such other sources and 
to accept such amount (including the amounts due from such other sources) as 
payment in full of Physician's charges for services obtained by Members. 
E. Physician shall bill on forms and in a manner acceptable to CIGNA as administrator 
of the MCA. Physician bhall furnish, on request, all information reasonably required 
by CIGNA, as administrator of the MCA. to verify and substantiate the Provider 
Services and the charges for such services. Physician shall submit bills to CIGNA or 
its designee. 
F. Physician shall not charge Members for Provider Services denied as not being 
Medically Necessary under Section MI of this \greement, unless Physician has 
obtained a written waiver from that Member. xjch a waiver shall be obtained in 
advance of the provision of chose Provider Services. The waiver shall c!car!v state 
that the Member acknowledges that such Provider Services are not covered under 
the Plan and that the Member shall be responsible for payment of charges for such 
Provider Services. 
G. Physician agrees that in no event, including but not limited to non-payment by 
CIGNA, or insolvency of CIGNA shall the Physician bill, charge, collect a deposit 
from, seek compensation, remuneration or reimbursement from, or have any 
recourse against a Member or persons (other than CIGNA) acting on Members 
behalf for services provided and compensated pursuant to this Agreement. This 
provision does not prohibit the provider from collecting copayments, coirsurance. 
deductibles, or fees for uncovered services delivered on a "fee-for-service" basis 'o 
Members. 
Physician agrees that this provision shall survive the termination of this Agreement 
for authorized services rendered prior to the termination of this Agreement, 
regardless of the cause giving nse to termination and shall be construed cc oe :cr 
the benefit of the Member. This provision is not intended to apply to xrrviccs 
prodded after this Agreement has been terminated. 
Physician agrees chat this provision supercedes any oral or written contrary 
agreement now existing or hereafter entered into between the Physician and the 
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Member, or persons acting on their behalf insofar as such contrary agreement relates 
to liability for payment for services provided under the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement. 
LTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 
A. CIGNA shall establish or contract for a Utilization Management program which shall 
seek to assure that Provider Services compensated under the Plan are Medically 
Necessary. 
B. Utilization Management for inpatient Hospital Services shall include: 
1. "Pre-admission review' to determine whether a scheduled inpatient admission 
is Medically Necessary. 
2. "Admission review" to determine whether an unscheduled inpatient admission 
or an admission not subject to pre-admission review was Medically Necessary. 
3- "Concurrent review' co determine whether a continued inpatient hospital stay 
is Medically Necessary. 
4. "Extended Stay Review" to review patients who are still in the hospital after the 
end of their authorized stay determined pursuant to the concurrent review-
process. 
5. "Retrospective Analysis" to study provider utilization patterns emerging from the 
hospital stays of Members. 
C. CIGNA shall have the right to establish or contract for establishment of a program 
of Physician Service Utilization Management to determine medical necessity of 
Physician Services. 
d. To promote the participation and effectiveness of the Utilization Management 
program. Physician shall notify CIGNA or its designated Utilization Management 
representative of any scheduled admissions at least 48 hours prior to such 
admission, or as soon as reasonably possible. Physician shall notify the revirw 
organization of an emergency admission(s) within one working day following the 
admission (s). 
E. Whenever any hospital admission has not been pre-certified. CIGNA or its designated 
Utilization Management representative may conduct retrospective review to 
determine whether Provider Services were Medically Necessary. 
F. Physician may appeal a Utilization Management decision. The appeal shall be 
commenced by requeuing in writing reconsideration by CIGNA or its designee. 
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G. CIGNA agrees to pay for the cost of Utilization Management. 
VIII. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
Physician agrees to notify CIGNA immediately of any of the following events: 
A. Institution of any legal action directly or indirectly alleging that Physician failed in 
any fashion to provide quality- medical care; 
B. Iniriation of any complaint, inquiry', investigation, or review with or by any licensing 
or regulatory authority, peer review organization, hospital committee, or other 
committee, organization or body which reviews quality of medical care which 
complaint, inquiry-, investigation, or review directly or indirectly, evaluates or focuses 
on the quality of care provided by Physician either in any specific instance or in 
general; 
C Any termination, reduction, or limitation of Physician's professional liability-
insurance; or. 
D. Any termination or suspension of Physician's license to practice medicine, any Board 
Certifications, or any hospital privileges. 
DC RECORDS MAINTENANCE. AVAILABILITY. INSPECTION AND AUDIT 
A. Physician shall prepare and maintain all appropriate records on Members receiving 
Medical Services. The records shall be maintained in accordance with prudent 
record-keeping procedures and as required by law. 
B. Physician agrees to allow review and duplication of any data and other records 
maintained on Members which relate to this Agreement, including but not limited 
to medical records or other records relating to billing, payment and assignment. 
Such review and duplication shall be allowed upon reasonable notice during regular 
business hours and shall be subject to all applicable laws and regulations concerning 
the confidentiality of such data or records. Such review and duplication nghs shall 
extend to CIGNA, as administrator of the MCA, and to its designated representatives 
and shall survive this Agreement. 
C. CIGNA and Physician agree to keep confidential and to take all reasonable 
precautions to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of any and all records required 
to be prepared and or maintained by this Agreement. Physician agrees to keep 
confidential and to take all reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure of the terms 
of this Agreement. 
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D. Subject to all applicable laws relating to privacy and confidentiality requirements, 
medical records of Members shall be made available upon reasonable request to 
each health professional treating the Member, for Utilization Management purposes, 
and to CIGNA, as administrator of the MCA. 
^ership and access to records of Members ; » ^ controlled by applicable laws. 
LIABILITY. INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE 
A Neither CIGNA nor Physician (including their respective agents or employees) shall 
be liable to third parties for any act or omission of the other parry. 
13 Throughout the term of this Agreement. Physician shall maintain at Phvsiaan s 
expense general and professional liability coverage in a form and amount acceptable 
to CIGNA. Physician shall give CIGNA or other payor a certificate of insurance 
evidencing such coverage upon request. Physician agrees to give CIGNA thirty (30) 
days prior written notices of cancellation, modification or termination of such 
insurance. Physician agrees to give CIGNA prompt written notice of any claims 
against Physician's liability coverage. 
C. Notice. Physician shall cause the issuers of such policies co deliver to CIGNA 
evidence of the existence of those policies and shall cause the issuers to give CIGNA 
thirty (30) days written notice prior to cancellation of. or any material change in, the 
policies. 
TERM AND TERMINATION 
A. The term of this Agreement shall begin on the effective date and shall continue until 
terminated by either party as provided for herein. 
B. This Agreement may be terminated without cause u: (60) days prior written 
notice by either party. 
CIGNA may terminate hr. Agreement immediately if: 
1. Physician fath to maintain licenses required to perform duties under this 
Agreement, or to comply with sate or federal laws, regulations, or Program 
Requirements. 
? Physician's professional liability coverage is canceled or Phvsiaan is vot 
insurable under professional liability insurance or fails to maintain otner 
satisfactory financial security arrangements. 
3 Physician willfully breaches habitually neglects or continually fails to pertorm 
professional duties. 
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4. The occurrence of any act or omission by Physician which is determined by 
CIGNA to be detrimental to the reputation, operation or activities of CIGNA. 
5. An administrative finding by any professional organization having recognized 
jurisdiction, or judgment of professional misconduct on the pan of Physician 
or Physician's employee(s). 
D. Notwithstanding termination. CIGNA, as administrator of the MCA, shall continue 
to have access to Physician's records for six (6) years from the date of provision of 
the Medical Services to which the records refer. The records shall be available in 
accordance with Article MIL to the extent permitted by law and as necessary to 
fulfill the terms of this Agreement. 
E. After the effective date of termination, this Agreement shall remain in effect for the 
resolution of all matters unresolved as of that date. 
F. This Agreement provides for an alternative method of payment of Physician charges 
incurred by the Member during the existence of this Agreement. It is not a contract 
for the provision of service to the Member. Termination of this Agreement 
terminates the alternative method of payment with regard to services provided after 
the date of termination. Termination of this Agreement should, in no way, be 
construed as affecting any Physician's relationship with his patient other than 
removing this alternative payment system. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
A. Assignment. No assignment of the rights, duties, or obligations of this Agreement 
shall be made by either party without the express written approval of the other party 
except that CIGNA may assign its rights, duties, or obligations to an affiliate of 
CIGNA without such prior written consent. 
B. Waiver of Breach. Waiver of any provision of this Agreement, or waiver of the 
breach of any provision of this Agreement, shall not be deemed a waiver of any 
other breach of the same or different provision. 
C. Notices. Any notice required to be given pursuant to the terms and provisions of 
this Agreement shall be in writing, postage prepaid, and shall be sent bv certified 
mail, return receipt requested, to CIGNA or Physician at the address on the signature 
page 
D. Severability. In the event any provision of this Agreement is rendered in^iid or 
unenforceable by any valid Act of Congress or of the Utah Legislature or by any 
regulation duly promulgated by officers of the United States or the State of Utah 
acting in accordance with law. or declared null and void by any court of competent 
CHP IT - 9 - 0178/91 
m 
jurisdiction, the remainder of the provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full 
force and effect. 
Entire Ai^ reement. This Agreement contains the entire Agreement between CIGNA 
and Physician relating to the rights granted and the obligations assumed by the 
parties concerning the reimbursement of charges for Participating Provider Services 
to Members. Any prior agreements, promises, negotiations or representations, either 
oral or written, relating to the subject matter of this Agreement not expressly set 
forth in this Agreement are of no force or effect. 
Amendment. This Agreement or any pan or section of it may be amended at any 
time during the term of the Agreement by mutual written consent of duly authorized 
representatives of CIGNA and Physician. This Agreement may be amended by CIGNA 
upon sixty (60) days' written notice to Physician prior to the effective date of such 
amendment, and such amendment shall be deemed accepted unless Physician 
notifies CIGNA not less than thirty (30) days prior to such- effective date char 
Physician does not accept the amendment. 
Attorney's Fees. In the event that either CIGNA or Physician institutes any action, 
or suit, proceeding to enfoecs the provisions of this Agreement each party snail pay 
its own attorney's fees and other costs. 
Headings. I he headings of articles and sections contained in this Agreement are tor 
reference purposes only and shall nor affec: in any way the meaning or 
interpretation of this Agreement. 
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance with 
the laws of the Sate of Utah. 
Dispute Resolution. CIGNA and Physician agree to meet and confer in good faith 
to resolve aly problems or disputes that may arise under this Agreement. 
In the event any dispute shall arise with respect to the performance or interpretation 
of any of the terms of this Agreement, all matters in controversy shall be submitted 
to an arbitrator selected by the American Arbitration Association. Arbitration shall 
proceed under the rules and regulations of the American Arbitration Assooacion 
governing commercial disputes. 
Both parries expressly covenant and agree to be bound by the decision or :ne 
arbitrator and accept any decision of the arbitrator as a final determination of the 
matter in dispute. Judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrator may be 
entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. Any fee or costs of such irbitranon 
shall be shared equally by the parties unless otherwise assessed by the arbitrator. 
Any administrative fee required shall l>e advanced by the party inir.anr.g the 
arbitration, subject to final apportionment by the arbitrator in the award. 
Arbitration shall take place in Bloomfield, CT. 
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This Agreement is effective 7"!'If . In witness whereof, the undersigned have hereto 
set their hands. 
BY: 
CONNECTICUT GENERAL UFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
ITS: 1W\nf\\\ Mirf, Pvyx\Art\T 
"Tftvyw L A\f(M\\fA\V 
(Pnnt Name) 
PHYSICLAN 
BY: 
ITS: 
Ckzr-te^ J^hdQ^ 
(Print Name) 
ADDRESS: 
gOO Cottage Grove Road 
Bjoomfield. CT 06002 
Attention: Network Operations 
3011 UT 
ADDRESS: 
.qftu >l)> Un\M&fs\\>) K e Moo 
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EXHIBIT A 
IU 
PARTICIPATING PHYSICIAN AGREEMENT 
COMPENSATION 
• • ou^iHan for Physician Services which 
CIGNA wtll reimburse the Ph>«an as » ' « * 2 ™ f ^ g a i n e d in A. Physician 
« , e appropriately authorized, when » » * « » * » - ' ^ „ . The Physician shall receive 
Z^^<^*»*att^\«JF£^%£^' *e ma*mum alowable 
,he lesser of the Physicians usual and " f 1 0 ™ ^ c,"%opUab|ecopayment.deductible 
01 "3 
. 12 -
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NOTICE: THIS AMENDMENT MODIFIES YOUR SERVICE AGREEMENT 
UNLESS YOU NOTIFY THE HEALTHPLAN TO THE CONTRARY 
WITHIN 30 DAYS 
AMENDMENT TO PHYSICIAN AGREEMENT 
WHEREAS, CIGNA Healthplan of Utah,Inc. ("Healthplan") and the Physician ("Physician") have 
executed a Physician Agreement (the "Agreement"); 
WHEREAS, Healthplan and Physician mutually desire to amend the Agreement; 
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to Section III.H. of the Agreement and in consideration of the 
mutual promises contained herein, the parties hereby agree as follows: 
1. The effective date of this Amendment shall be December 2 , 1992. 
2. Section B. of the SPECIALTY CARE PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION ATTACHMENT, 
shall be restated as follows: 
"Physician's reimbursement for specialty care Covered Services shall be the lesser of 
Physician's billed charges or Healthplan's maximum fee schedule, less applicable 
Copayments, Deductibles and Coinsurance amounts received from Members." 
3. Except as modified herein, the Agreement remains in full force and effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Healthplan and Physician have executed this Amendment this 29 th 
day of October 1992. 
CIGNA HEALTHPIAN OF UTAH, INC. 
BV: / ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ 
ItS: Fvprnf-ivp H i r p ^ n r _ 
3674.UT 
AMD91 HMO PA 06/17/92 UT 
m 
PARSONS. DAVIES. KINGHORN & PETERS 
A PROrCSSlONAL CORPORATION 
* PARSONS ATTORNETS AT LAW 
<$ £. 0AV1ES 
to H KINGHORN
 3 l o S Q U T H MAIN STREET TELEPHONE 
*^rHOMAS PETERS I80I I 3 G 3 - 4 3 0 0 
^ > N T. OWEN. JR. SUITE HOO FACSIMILE 
^a U KNUTH SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84IOI (80II 3 6 3 - 4 3 7 6 
dtC0PTf L. PROBST 
*\£N P- JONES 
w , 0 W. SCOFIELO 
• PHT.OUNBECK.JR. 
•&^VHISSSr September 15, 1994 
VIA FACSIMILE 
375-5607 
J. Grant Moody, Esq. 
Fisher, Scribner, Moody & Stirland 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Re: Pledger v. Gillespie. Civil No. 940000083 
Fourth Circuit Court, Utah County, State of Utah 
American Fork Department 
Dear Mr. Moody: 
This letter will confirm our telephone conversation today wherein you agreed that 
Cigna Healthplan may have an open-ended extension to respond to the Third Party 
Complaint served upon it in the above-referenced matter. As we discussed, I believe the 
clear language of the physician agreement Dr. Pledger signed with Cigna Heahhpian 
precludes his suit against your client. I have sent Mr. Harding a copy of that agreement 
and anticipate that we will be able to resolve this litigation without further expense by way 
of attorneys' fees after he has had the opportunity to review the pertinent language. 
Very truly yours, 
/ ry^SONS, D^VIESj KINGftO|RN &/PETERS 
DWS:rf 
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CIGNA Healthcare 
of Utah 
1994 
ff\ 1200 w # 8 
J - t f grt- Gillespie, 
M start out by apologizing t o you and your husband for the 
ffLfans y0U nave had with the payment of a claim by CIGNA for 
ErYices you received from Dr. Pledger. After research, we do 
!fjC| tftat the claim should have been paid d i f f erent ly than i t was 
Jjt *o have sent an additional payment t o Dr. Pledger according 
•Jtno contractual agreement he had with CIGNA. 
fog have incurred costs and fees separate from the claim 
rtfaittod by Dr. Pledger. I would l i k e t o meet with you (at your 
convenience and at a place convenient for you) to acquire 
r*c#ipts for the costs you have incurred. Would you please 
poo tact me at your e a r l i e s t convenience so that we may meet to 
UtaiBB th i s with you? 
Thank you for your patience as we reso lve t h i s matter. 
Sl/jcerely your£, 
•flrdb* 
Kartha Spooir/ 
Manager, Customer Sat i s fact ion 
EXHIBIT P 
O f) O O tt I C 
|"70 
HAHDING & A S S O C I A T E S , P.C. 
A T T O R N E Y S AT UAW 
3 0 8 W C S T M A I N S T R I C T 
AMERICAN FORK, UTAH 8 4 0 0 3 
T E L E P H O N E ( B O D 7 8 8 - 7 8 0 8 
F A C S I M I L E ( 8 0 I ) 7 8 8 - 7 8 0 0 
^ A H S 
PLEASANT O R O V E O F F I C E 
IIO S O U T H MAIN STREET 
PLEASANT O R O V E , UTAH 8 4 O 0 2 
T E L E P H O N E (SOD 7 8 5 - 5 3 B O 
FACSIMILE (SOI) 7 8 5 - 0 8 5 3 
January 13, 1995 
navid W. Scofield 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
Attorneys at Law 
310 South Main Street, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Charles V. Pledger, M.D. vs. Ople Gillespie 
Dear Mr. Scofield: 
Pursuant to you request, enclosed please find a copy of 
the termination letter which Dr. Pledger sent to Cigna Health Care. 
As you can see, the letter is dated October 25, 1993. I have also 
faxed a copy of the termination letter to Martha Spoor of Cigna 
Health Care. 
Please advise me immediately as to whether or not you 
have obtained the dates of payment and the amounts of payment on 
the Ople Gillespie account from Cigna Health Care so this matter 
can be resolved. 
Very truly yours, 
te & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
NG, JR. 
RMH/dw 
Enclosure 
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PARSONS. DAVTES. KINGHORN & P E T E R S 
A PROTCSSIONA&. CORPORATION 
pA/?SONS ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
£c OAVIES 
'0 H . KINGHORN 185 SOUTH STATE STREET TELEPHONE 
jgrSJSSS. S U , T E 7 0° «eo„3«3-ooo 
£ ^ L PROBST SALT LAKE C.TY. UTAH 8 * . , , , 8 0 0 ^ ^ 7 8 
K£N P. JONES 
-ViD W. SCOFIELD 
£ p H T. DUNBECK. JR. 
fUART W. HINCKLEY 
0. KIMBALL MOSIER 
^A L L L ^ 0 P TC N E March 13, 1995 
RASHELLE PERRY 
Ray M. Harding, Jr., Esq. 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Via Fax: 756-7699 
J. Grant Moody, Esq. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Via Fax: 375-5607 
Re: Pledger v. Gillespie 
Gentlemen: 
I have crossed telephone calls with you on a few occasions, and want to let you know 
what my position is on the facts as known to me. First, Mr. Harding's office has told me 
that the charges for which payment is sought have been incurred in 1994. CIGNA has no 
records indicating any charges from Dr. Pledger in 1994. It appears to me that this 
information is incorrect. I note, however, that the Third Party Complaint served upon my 
client does not have attached to it a copy of Dr. Pledger's Complaint, and I have no 
separate copy thereof. If the Complaint seeks payment for charges in 1993, it would cieariy 
be barred under the terms of the operative agreement, and Dr. Pledger would be in breach 
of his contract and liable for all of Ms. Gillespie's costs and expenses and CIGNA's cost 
and expenses incurred as the result of such breach. CIGNA's records are clear that 
payment in accordance with the terms of the agreement was made to Dr. Pledger for 
services provided to Ms. Gillespie in March of 1993. No further sums are owing for those 
services. 
Mr. Harding's office has provided me with a photocopy of a letter purportedly sent 
by Dr. Pledger on or about October 25, 1993, terminating his contract. If that notice was 
EXHIBITG \&1 
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Ray M. Harding, Esq. 
J. Grant Moody, Esq. 
March 13, 1995 
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served properly, the agreement would be deemed terminated sixty (60) days following the 
provision of such written notice, or on December 24, 1993. Under that scenario, Dr 
Pledger is unable to sue Ms. Gillespie for any charges incurred by her with him on or 
before December 24, 1993, but would be able to sue Ms. Gillespie for any charges incurred 
by her with him subsequent to that date. 
I do note, however, that the letter sent to me by Mr. Harding's office does not 
comply with the requirements of the agreement concerning proper notice for termination, 
in that there is no indication that it was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
Further, the entire CIGNA file on Dr. Pledger has now been reviewed by me and such 
termination letter does not appear anywhere in that file. That of course is not an issue if 
the services rendered by Dr. Pledger were rendered on or before December 24, 1993, in 
any event, because Dr. Pledger would be in breach of his agreement if he is suing Ms. 
Gillespie for charges for those services. 
There appears, therefore, to be some factual matters which are still unclear, the 
most important of which is when the charges were incurred by Ms. Gillespie with Dr. 
Pledger. If those charges were incurred on or before December 24, 1994, Dr, Pledger 
clearly is in breach of his agreement with CIGNA and must immediately cease from 
proceeding with the lawsuit, stipulate to set aside the judgment and to have a dismissal 
without prejudice and then seek to arbitrate any dispute with CIGNA he may have. If Ms. 
Gillespie's treatment occurred after December 24, 1993, then we are in more of a gray 
area. However, I have seen no evidence to suggest that Ms. Gillespie received any services 
after December 24, 1993. If such evidence exists, I would appreciate seeing it so that 
CIGNA can evaluate whether it desires to challenge the validity of Dr. Pledger's notice of 
termination. 
Very truly yours, 
^ARSONS, \DAVta, KINraOR 
David W. Scofiel* 
Attorneys for CIGNA Healthpl 
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RONALD F. PRICE February /, 1,^ % 
RASHELLE PERRY 
Clerk of the Fourth Circuit Court 
98 North Center Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Re: Pledger v. Gillespie, Civil No, 940000083CV, i 'iiituii \ IHIK, Statr nf I luh, 
Utah County, American Fork Department\ 
Dear Qexk; 
1 enclose with this letter a check payable to the Circuit Court, State of Utah, Utah 
County, American Fork Department, not to exceed $50.00. I would like you to make 
copies of the documents listed below which are filed in the above-referenced case, and to 
affix postage to the self-addressed envelope enclosed, in an appropriate sum, and to issue 
a receipt to me for the copying and postage which you make the check out for. The 
documents which I would like copies of are: 
1. Complaint, filed January 14, 1994. 
2 Answer, filed February 14, 1994, 
3. Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Plaintiffs Counsel and Affida1it 
of Charles V. Pledger, filed March 4, 1994, 
4. Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Bi imp, Third Party Complaint, 
filed March 31, 1994. 
J. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Response to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed March 31, 1994. 
Affidavit of Plaintiffs Counsel, filed March 31, 1994. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Bring Third Party Complaint, filed 
April 1, 1994. 
8 Defendant's Response to I Ma intiff "s I\ lot ioi i f c: • Si nil n: lai ) Judgment,, filed 
April 1, 1994. 
9. Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to 
Bring Third Party Complaint, filed April 8, 1994. 
10. Order Granting Leave to File Third Party Complaint, filed by J.C. Backman, 
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filed April 13, 1994. 
11. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 4,1994. 
12. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, signed by J.C. 
Backman, filed May 6, 1994. 
If you have any questions regarding this request, please feel free to call me. 
Very truly yours, 
DWSrmw 
Enc. 
& PETERS 
